

AGENT-BASED MODELING OF SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC CONTROL STRATEGIES

**Secretary's Council on
Public Health Preparedness**


Donald S. Burke and Joshua M. Epstein

**Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
and the Brookings Institution**

23 September 2003

Smallpox Cases by Relationship to Transmitting Case for 680 Cases Occurring in Europe 1950-1971 (Mack, 1972)


Key role of households and hospitals




County-Level Model: 800 individuals

- **2 Towns**
- **Per Town Assumptions**
 - **400 people comprised of**
 - **100 Households, each with 2 adults and 2 kids**
 - **Non-commuting adults work at the town workplace**
 - **10% adults of commute to the other town's workplace**
 - **5 adult hospital workers**
 - **Kids go to school in the town school**
 - **1 workplace**
 - **1 school**
- **1 Common Hospital**
 - **10 adult hospital workers**
- **1 Common Morgue**


Individuals on screen change color as they become infected and progress through the stages of smallpox



Computer screen at start of model run: one infected individual
[N.B. “night-time” = all individuals at home, not at work or school]



Computer screen on DAY1 of model run: one infected individual
[N.B. “Day-time” = all individuals are at work or school]




All individuals go home at night, and the cycle repeats every “day”

Computer screen well into the epidemic




Overhead Agent View



WORK SCHOOL

Overhead Agent View




WORK SCHOOL

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
Morgue

Schematic summary of scenarios examined

	<u>Scenario</u>									
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
Background Immunity	No	Yes	—————→							
Household contact trace 100%			Yes	—————→						
Work/school contact trace 75%			Yes	—————→						
Hospital Vac & Isol (>20d)			Yes	—————→						
Preemptive Hospital Vaccination				10%	50%	10%	50%	10%	50%	10%
Reactive School Closure 10 d						Yes	—————→			
Mass Reactive Vaccination						40%	40%	80%	80%	None





Basic social unit



Three variations of more complex social architectures


Contact dendrogram of a short-lived epidemic lasting only 2 generations (N.B. only one index case)






Contact dendrogram of a rapidly expanding epidemic (N.B. only one index case)

**Run to Run Variability in Model Output (6K Uniform Town):
Mean and Standard Deviation**





Complex percolation of an epidemic through a social structure consisting of six linked districts

Example of Results

Table showing results of simulated epidemics in 6K town, Scenarios 1 through 10, Ring Architecture , 25 simulated epidemics each scenario

(total number of simulations = 10 x 25 = 250 simulated epidemics):

6k Ring

Scenario	Mean Infections	SD	Vaccinated	SD	Deaths	SD	Vac/Inf	Mean Duration	SD Duration
1	5377.7	78.6	0	0	1728.3	36.9	0	298.5	52.5
2	4929.3	108.1	0	0	1588.7	48.3	0	307.7	38.7
3	94.2	34.4	2096.4	393.8	33.1	12.5	22	96.5	23.5
4	106.6	37.6	2200.3	389.3	37.2	11.7	21	105.9	29.3
5	104.2	39.3	2120.8	469.1	35.8	14.4	20	100.9	29.9
6	81.2	21.4	3344.5	220.1	28.8	8.2	41	81.4	17.5
7	74.5	17.7	3322.8	194.1	28.5	7.3	45	81.3	16.7
8	59.4	19.5	4815.6	48.3	20.4	6.8	81	61.5	8.9
9	55.8	13.6	4816.4	47	22.4	5.6	86	62.4	9.1
10	102.8	40.3	2254.1	424.8	35	13.7	22	106.2	28.7

Modeling: Key concepts

- New epidemics are highly *stochastic* (not at equilibrium and not evenly mixed throughout the population)
- Vaccines can protect through
 - (1) *Direct protection* of vaccinees
 - (2) *Herd immunity* protection of non-vaccinees
 - (3) *“Quenching”* of nascent epidemics before they begin
- *Targeting* of vaccination (eg to hospital workers and household contacts) can provide substantial protection to the entire population
- Control strategies (preemptive vaccination, isolation, reactive vaccination) can act *synergistically* to completely quench epidemics

END